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Private Insurers Suspending Workers' Compensation
Benefits Are Not State Actors and Employee's
Medical Treatment Must Be Reasonable and
Necessary Before Due Process Attaches: American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan
42 U.S.C. § 1983 - STATE ACTION - The United
States Supreme Court held that private workers' compensation
insurers are not converted to state actors merely because the
business is subject to extensive state regulation, and due process

DUE PROCESS

procedures are not implicated until the employee's property interest

attaches by proving the medical treatment was reasonable and
necessary.
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S.
Ct. 977 (1999).
In an effort to control health care costs, Pennsylvania amended

its Workers' Compensation Act ("Act")' in 1993 to permit an insurer
to dispute the reasonableness or necessity of the medical treatment
provided to an insured employee by requesting a "utilization
review."2 By requesting such a review, the insurer suspends
payment of workers' compensation benefits to the health care
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-2626 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). "Pennsylvania's Workers'
Compensation Act creates a system of no-fault liability for work-related injuries and makes
employers' liability under this system 'exclusive ... of any and all other liability.'" American
Manufacturers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977, 982 (1999) (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

77, § 481 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998)). "All employers subject to the Act must either (1) obtain
workers' compensation insurance from a private insurer, (2) obtain such insurance through
the State Workers' Insurance Fund (SWIF), or (3) seek permission from the state to
self-insure." Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 982. (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501(a) (West 1992 &
Supp. 1998)).
2. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 982. Under Pennsylvania law, an employer who is liable for an
employee's work-related injury must pay for all "reasonable and necessary" treatment. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 531(1)(i), (5) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998). "Utilization review" is a
procedure "under which the reasonableness and necessity of an employee's past, ongoing, or
prospective medical treatment could be reviewed before a medical bill must be paid" by the
insurance company. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct at 982 (citing Pa STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 531(6) (West
1992 & Supp. 1998)). Before enacting the "utilization review" procedure, Pennsylvania did not
provide an insurer with effective means of recovering payments for medical treatment that
was later determined to be unreasonable or unnecessary. Id. at 982, n.2.
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provider 3 until resolution of the dispute. 4 The insurer requests
utilization review by' filing a one-page form with the Workers'
Compensation Bureau of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor
and Industry ("Bureau"), which makes no attempt to validate the
legitimacy of the request but only determines whether the form is
properly completed 5 The Bureau then informs the injured
employee, the employer, and the health care provider that the
claim is under review and "forwards the request to a randomly
selected 'utilization review organization' ("URO")." 6 The URO then
determines, based on medical records and statements by the health
care provider and the injured employee, whether the treatment was
reasonable and necessary.7
In 1996, ten injured employees and two labor organizations filed
a 42 U.S.C § 19831 suit against private insurance companies and
other defendants
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that by
r.
3. Pennsylvania defines "health care provider" as:
A person, corporation, facility, or institution licensed, or otherwise authorized, by the
Conmonwealth to provide health care services, including physicians, coordinated care
organizations, hospitals, health care facilities, dentists, nurses, optometrists,
podiatrists, physical therapists, psychologists, chiropractors, or pharmacists, and
officers, employees, or agents of the person acting in the course and scope of
employment or agency related health care services.
34 PA. CODE § 127.3 (1998).
4. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 983.
5. See id. "The form identifies (among other things) the employee, the medical
provider, the date of the employee's injury, and the medical treatment to be reviewed." Id.
(citing 34 PA. CODE §§ 127.404(b), 127.452(a) (1998)).
6. Id. at 983. "URO's are private organizations consisting of health care providers who
are 'licensed in the same or similar profession. . . or specialty as that of the provider of the
treatment under review.'" Id. at 983 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 531(6)(i) (West 1992 &
Supp. 1998)). Any question as to the reasonableness and necessity of a given procedure must
be resolved in favor of the medical provider, whose treatment is under review. 34 PA. CODE §
127.471(b) (1998). The provider, employer, employee, or insurer is given the opportunity to
appeal; however, if the URO finds in favor of the insurer, the insurer need not pay for the
disputed services unless the courts overrule the URO's holding. PA STAT. ANN tit. 77, §
531(6)(iv) (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); 34 PA CODE § 127.556 (1998). Conversely, if the URO
rules on behalf of the employee, the insurer is then contiguously responsible for the
challenged bill, plus 10 percent annual interest and the cost of the utilization review.
Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 983; PA STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 531(6)(iii, iv) (West Supp.1998); 34 PA
CODE § 127.208(e) (1998).
7. See 34 PA CODE § 127.470(a) (1998).
8. Federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part: "Every person who,
under color of any statute . . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured. . . . " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
9. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 983-84. The plaintiffs were individual employees and two
organizations (the Philadelphia Area Project on Occupational Safety and Health and the
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withholding workers' compensation benefits during the utilization
review, the private insurance companies were acting under the
color of state law and denying the employees' property rights
without due process of law. 10
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania dismissed the complaint against the private insurers
on the ground that they were not state actors." The district court
also dismissed the cause of action against the Commonwealth
officials, reasoning that the procedure for withholding payment for
disputed medical treatment, as defined in the Act, does not violate
12
due process.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed and found that a private insurer's decision to
suspend payment under the Act constitutes state action, because
once an insurer, though a private entity, operates under the
construct of the extensively state-regulated system of workers'
compensation, it effectively becomes an arm of the state and fulfills
the "uniquely governmental obligation" of providing or withholding
state entitlements.13 Concerning, the due process issue, the Third
Circuit did not address whether disabled employees possess a
property interest in suspended workers' compensation benefits, but
rather focused on what process is due. 4 The Third Circuit found
that suspending insurance payments before employees have had the
opportunity to submit a written personal statement to the URO
regarding their view of the reasonableness and/or necessity of the
disputed treatment violated due process. 5
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers representing employees who received medical benefits
under the Act). Id. at 983. "Named as defendants were various Pennsylvania officials who
administer the Act, the director of State Workers Insurance Fund (SWIF), the School District
of Philadelphia, and a number' of private insurance companies who provide workers'
compensation coverage in Pennsylvania." Id. at 984.
10. See id. at 984. The U.S. Constitution provides as follows: "[n]or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . " U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Due process of law is defined as "a course of legal proceedings
according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of
*jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
500 (6th ed. 1990).
11. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 984.
12. See id.
13. See Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F3d 158, 168 (1998).
14. See Sullivan, 139 F3d at 171. The material part of Sullivan's complaint is that lack
of notice afforded under the Act violates procedural due process guarantees. Id. The Third
Circuit did not address the existence of property interests because "[n]either party disputes"
this issue. Id. at 171 n.23.
15. See id. at 162. At the time of the Third Circuit decision, employees were not
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 16 to resolve
two issues: (1) whether a private insurer's decision to withhold
payment for disputed medical treatment constitutes state action
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and (2) whether "due process prohibits
insurers from withholding payment for disputed medical treatment
7
pending [utilization] review."
Concerning the state action issue, the Court concluded that a
private insurer's decision to withhold payment and seek utilization
review of the reasonableness and necessity of particular medical
treatments is not attributable to the state.' 8 The Court emphasized
that, to successfully claim relief in an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the plaintiffs must prove that they were deprived of a
constitutionally protected right and "that the alleged deprivation
was committed under color of state law."19
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on a two-part analysis
defined in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 20 The Court stated that to
establish state action, the claimant must first prove that the
"alleged constitutional deprivation [was] 'caused by the exercise of
some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the State," such as acts taken by a private entity
pursuant to state law.2' In addition, the claimant must establish that
permitted to submit in writing to the URO their view regarding the reasonableness and
necessity of the challenged treatment. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 983 n.3. "The Bureau modified
its procedures in response to the Court of Appeals' decision, and now provides for more
extensive notice and an opportunity for employees to provide at least some input into the
URO's decision." Id.
16. Certiorari is defined as "a writ of common law origin issued by a superior to an
inferior court requiring the latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried
therein." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990). "The writ is issued in order that the
court issuing the writ may inspect the proceedings and determine whether there have been
any irregularities." Id.
17. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct at 984-85.
18. See id. The Court stated that:
Perhaps hoping to avoid the traditional application of our state-action cases,
respondents attempt to characterize their claim as a "facial" or "direct" challenge to
the utilization review procedures contained in the Act, in which case, the argument
goes, we need not concern ourselves with the "identity of the defendant" or the "act
or decision by a private actor or entity" who is relying on the challenged law.
Id. (citing Brief for the Respondents 16). This argument, however, ignores the constitutional
requirement of state action in order to find that an act violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
19. Id. at 985. "Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach 'merely private conduct,
no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." Id.
20. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 985; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
21. Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
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the party charged with the deprivation be a state actor, either
"[b]ecause [the party] is a state official [or] because [the party] has
acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state

officials ....

"22

The Supreme Court reasoned that while the private insurer's
conformance to the Pennsylvania statute satisfies the first
requirement, the plaintiffs failed to meet the second criterion. 23 The
Court began by identifying "the specific conduct of which the
plaintiff complains," namely, the suspended payment of disputed
medical treatment. 24 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, reasoned that a private insurer's decisions do not
constitute state action simply because the private insurer is subject
to state regulation. 25 In addition, the Court emphasized that in
order to hold private insurers to Fourteenth Amendment standards,
a sufficiently close nexus must exist between the state and the
26
challenged action.
The plaintiffs primarily argued that the decision to withhold
payment may be fairly attributable to the Commonwealth because
Pennsylvania encouraged private insurers to suspend payment
when it amended its Workers' Compensation Act.27 The Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion, holding that the amendment
to the Workers' Compensation Act merely shows that Pennsylvania,
in managing the compensation of disabled employees, considers it
appropriate to allow insurers to defer payment of a bill until the
claim is substantiated.28 Relying on Blum v. Yaretsky, 29 and
reasoning that the Bureau's participation is limited to requiring
insurers to file a properly completed form, the majority also
rejected the argument that the private insurer's decision to suspend
benefits is state action because insurers must first obtain
22. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
23. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 985-86.
24. See id. at 985.
25. See id. at 986.
26. See id. "Whether such a 'close nexus' exists.., depends on whether the State 'has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or
covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.'" Id.
27. See id. The amendment permits private insurers to request utilization review and
suspend payment regarding disputed benefits until such review has been completed. Id. at
987.
28. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 987. The majority reasoned that state permission of an
insurer's private choice cannot support a finding of state action that encourages private
conduct. Id.
29. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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authorization from the Bureau before withholding payment. 30
Plaintiffs next contended that state action is present by
advancing a twofold argument: (1) workers' compensation benefits
are state-mandated public benefits that Pennsylvania is obligated to
provide, and (2) Pennsylvania "has delegated to insurers the
traditionally exclusive government function of determining whether
[challenged] medical benefits may be suspended." 31 The majority
refuted the first contention by holding that neither Pennsylvania's
Constitution nor its statutory plan requires Pennsylvania to provide
medical treatment or workers' compensation benefits to injured
workers.3 2 The Court also rejected the second contention by
reasoning that neither historical practice nor the Pennsylvania
statutory scheme classifies the decision to suspend payment for
disputed medical treatment as an exclusive government function. 3
Finally, the Court, stating that this case involved private entities
providing services that the State is not obligated to furnish, opined
that the plaintiffs incorrectly relied on the joint participation theory
of state action?' Specifically, the plaintiffs reasoned that the joint
participation theory is implicated because the Pennsylvania system
"inextricably entangles the insurance companies in a partnership
with [Pennsylvania] such that they become an integral part of
[Pennsylvania] in administering the statutory scheme."35 However,
the majority found no state action, holding that joint participation
requires something more than a private entity taking advantage of
review
and extensively
regulated utilization
state-created
30. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 987 (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at 1007). The Court cited
Blum for the proposition that a state requirement that a private party complete a form does
not convert the conduct of the private party into state action. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 987. The
court of appeals upheld the argument that the decision by private insurers to suspend
benefits is state action because insurers must first obtain authorization from the Bureau
before withholding payment. Sullivan, 139 F3d at 158, 68.
31. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 987.
32. See id. at 988.
33. See id. The Supreme Court has held that if "Pennsylvania first recognized an
insurer's traditionally private prerogative to withhold payment, then restricted it, and now (in
one limited respect) has restored it, [such decisions] cannot constitute the delegation of an
exclusive public function." Id.
34. See id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)). Later
cases, such as Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., have redefined the vague "joint participation"
test embodied in Burton, an early case dealing with "state action" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. State action arises under the joint participation theory in situations where
the state and a private entity jointly participate in conformance to a state statutory scheme
that deprives an individual of property without due process. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).
35. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 988 (quoting Sullivan, 139 F3d at 170).
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procedures. 36
Regarding the due process issue,37 the Supreme Court, unlike the
Court of Appeals, held to the rationale of Mathews v. Eldridge,3
which prescribes that only after finding a deprivation of a
protected interest should the Court address whether a state's
procedures comport with due process.3 9 As a result, the majority
did not focus on what process is due, but rather first examined
whether the Due Process Clause was implicated at all by the
instant case. 40 In its analysis, the Court considered whether an
employee possesses a property interest in having insurers pay for
disputed medical treatment and held that a property interest arises
only after a URO deems the medical treatment provided to be
reasonable
and
necessary.41
Consequently,
Pennsylvania's
permission for insurers to suspend payment of disputed medical
benefits neither implicates nor violates Fourteenth Amendment due
42
process guarantees concerning property rights.
Plaintiffs asserted that once an employer's liability is established,
the Pennsylvania workers' compensation law confers upon them a
protected property interest concerning the consequent medical
benefits.43 Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Pennsylvania law
expressly limits an employee's entitlement to only reasonable and
necessary treatment and requires that disputes over the
reasonableness and necessity of particular treatment be resolved
before an employee's entitlement to benefits arise." Hence, for an
employee's property interest in the payment of medical benefits to
attach under state law, the employee must prove: (1) "that an
employer is liable for a work-related injury" and (2) "that the
particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary."4
The Court concluded that while the plaintiffs established the first
prerequisite, they did not satisfy the second; therefore, plaintiffs did
36. See id. at 989.
37. See id. "Though [its] resolution of the state-action issue would be sufficient by
itself to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, [the Supreme Court] believed that the
[lower appellate] court fundamentally misapprehended the nature of the [plaintiffs'] property
interests at stake in this case ....
"Id.
38. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
39. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 990.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 990.
44. See id.
45. Id.
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not have any property interest on which to base their claim.46
Thus, the Court held that a private insurer's decision to withhold
payment for disputed medical treatment does not constitute state
action and the Due Process Clause does not prohibit insurers from
withholding payment for disputed medical treatment pending
47
utilization review.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg agreed
with the majority that the plaintiffs had no protected property
rights at stake that could subject insurers to Fourteenth
Amendment constraints. 48 However, Justice Ginsburg argued that
the Court should have limited its analysis to such case-dispositive
grounds, without analyzing the non-dispositive question of whether
state action was present.49
Justice Stephen Breyer also concurred with the Court's opinion
and its judgment, but added that an injured employee may have a
constitutionally protected property interest when that person has a
reasonable expectation of continued payments based on the receipt
of earlier distributions.5
In a separate opinion, Justice Paul Stevens agreed that the Court
of Appeals' judgment should be reversed with respect to the
present modified procedures, which were implemented in response
to the Court of Appeals' decision. 51 Justice Stevens, however,
dissented from the majority by arguing that the controlling issue of
the case is whether the Pennsylvania procedures were fair and not
whether the insurance company was a state actor.5 2
In 1883, the Civil Rights Cases demonstrated the first significant
articulation by the Supreme Court that Fourteenth Amendment
rights are applicable only where state action is present.' The
statute in question, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, clearly regulated
private conduct, and the question before the Court was whether
Congress had the power to enact such a statute.M The majority
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 991 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
49. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
50. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
51. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. See id. at 992. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases involve the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, in which Congress prohibited all persons (not just state governments)
from denying, on the basis of race, any individual's equal access to inns, public
transportation, theaters and other place of public accommodation. Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 4-5.
54. See id. at 8-9.
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reasoned that the guarantees of equal protection and due process,
given by the Fourteenth Amendment, 55 apply by their terms solely
to state action and not private action. 56 Therefore, the 1875 Civil
Rights Act was declared unconstitutional because it not only
regulated racial discrimination by the states, but also racial
57
discrimination that stemmed from purely private conduct.
The narrow view of what constitutes state action, implicit in the
Civil Rights Cases, remained in force until the 1940s; it was not
until Shelley v. Kraemerp that the Supreme Court began to broaden
its view of state action. 59 The Shelley Court wrestled with the issue
of whether state courts could judicially enforce, without violating
the Fourteenth Amendment, a racially restrictive covenant entered
into by homeowners that their property would not be owned by
anyone but Caucasians. 6° The Justices rationalized that this case
did not involve the state remaining inactive while one private
citizen discriminated against another. Rather, they determined that
the state's judicial branch was enabling the discrimination to
occur.6' In addition, the Court reasoned that even the application of
facially neutral laws, such as the enforcement of a private contract,
might be construed as a commandment from the state to
discriminate, thereby warranting a finding of state action.62
Consequently, Chief Justice Fred Vinson, writing for the Court, held
that the judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants does
constitute state action, and such conduct violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
55. See id. at 11. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
57. See id. at 24.
58. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley involved the enforceability of racially restrictive
covenants entered into by homeowners that their properties would only be owned by
Caucasians. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4. When African-Americans bought homes from willing
Caucasian owners despite such covenants, other Caucasians, who were owners of properties
also subject to the covenants, sued to block the African-Americans from taking possession.
Id. at 6.
59. See id. at 8. "Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color
is a question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider." Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 19. "[B]ut for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the
full panoply of state power, [defendants] would have been free to occupy the properties in
question ....
" Id.
62. See id. at 17-18.
63. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
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The Supreme Court further broadened the concept of state action
in 1961 with Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.64 The
question confronting the Court in Burton was whether state action
exists when a state and a private discriminator are entangled in a
mutually beneficial relationship. 65 Relying on the fact that the
state's successful operation of a public facility was heavily
dependent upon the privately-operated restaurant lease and the
discrimination itself,66 Justice Tom Clark found that the state had
an affirmative obligation to insert a non-discrimination requirement
in the lease. 67 Furthermore, the Burton Court held that this duty
could not have been avoided even upon a showing by the state of
good faith or a showing of a complete absence of motive to
encourage discrimination.6 In light of this symbiotic relationship
between the private entity and the state, the majority attributed the
discriminatory private conduct to the state and ruled that such
69
conduct violated the Due Process Clause.
In 1967, the Court once again expanded the concept of state
action in Reitman v. Mulkey 70 by holding that state action may also
arise where the state has encouraged discrimination. 71 In Reitman,
California voters had amended the state constitution to prohibit the
government from interfering with any private individual's right to
discriminate in the sale or lease of residential real estate. 72 The
64. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Burton involved the relationship between a parking building
owned and run by the Wilmington Parking Authority (a state agency), and a restaurant run
by a private company within the building, under a lease with the Authority. Burton, 365 U.S.
at 716. The restaurant refused to serve African-Americans and no provision in Delaware at
the time required private companies to do so. Id. at 717. An African-American, who was
refused service, contended that the Parking Authority's involvement with the restaurant was
sufficient enough to connect the discrimination to state action, which is violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 720.
65. See id. at 717.
66. See id. at 724. The project could not have been financed without rents from
commercial tenants like the restaurant. Id. at 723-724.. Furthermore, because the restaurant
claimed that its business would be hurt if it were forced to serve African-Americans, the
profits earned by discrimination were indispensable elements in the project's financial
success. Id. at 724.
67. See id. at 725. Under state law regarding leases of public property, the Authority
could have required the private restaurant not to discriminate. Id. at 720.
68. See id. at 725.
69. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 717, 726.
70. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
71. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381.
72. See id. at 370-71. In a statewide ballot, California voters ratified Proposition 14,
which provides in part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or

American Manufacturers v. Sullivan

2000

Supreme Court affirmed the state court's decision to strike the
constitutional amendment by holding that the amendment's purpose
and effect 7 3 ultimately encourages discrimination, and that such
encouragement constitutes state action in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 4 The Reitman Court indicated, however,
that the mere failure by a state to forbid private discrimination
would not constitute state action.7 5 The Court then reasoned that
even if the state enacted fair housing legislation and then repealed
it, the repeal by the legislature would most likely not have been
considered state action since such repeal would merely restore the
7
status quo.

6

After expanding the concept of state action from the 1940s
through the 1960s, the Court then began to narrow the situations
that would trigger state action with the 1972 case of Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis.77 In Moose Lodge, a private club refused service to
a black guest of a club member. 78 The guest contended that, since
the state had given the club one of a limited number of liquor
licenses, this act of licensing and the act of regulating such a
license was sufficient to render the club's discrimination as state
action.7 9 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the "detailed
type of regulation" the state requires the club to adhere to in order
to maintain the license "cannot be said to foster or encourage
racial discrimination."8 0 Furthermore, the Moose Lodge majority
believed that the mere fact that a state grants a license to an entity
does not transform the private entity's conduct into state action,
81
even where the number of licenses is limited.
rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property
to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
CAL. CONST. of art. I, § 26 (Proposition 14).

73. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381. An immediate effect and purpose of the
constitutional amendment was to overturn two statutes that barred private residential
housing discrimination. Id. at 374
74. See id. at 373, 381.
75. Id. at 376. Even giving Reitman a broad reading, it seems extremely unlikely that
the mere failure by a state to forbid private discrimination constitutes state action. Id. Thus
had California never enacted any legislation dealing with private housing discrimination, its
inaction would almost certainly not be deemed state conduct. Id.
76. See id. at 380-81.
77. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
78. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 163.
79. See id. at 165.
80. See id. at 176-77. The Court distinguished this situation, which entails a private club
in a private building, from that in Burton, where there was a symbiotic relationship between
a privately operated restaurant and a publicly-owned building. Id. at 174-75.
81. See id. at 177. The majority suggested, however, that the result might have been
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Two years later, the Supreme Court further constricted the
2 The
theory of state action in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison.1
Jackson Court addressed the issue of whether actions by an
extensively regulated, natural monopoly are attributable to the state
when this private entity performs a function that is public in
nature.s3 Because state law did not require the state to furnish
utilities, the majority concluded that the utility company did not
exercise powers exclusively reserved to the state, thus there was
not a sufficient relationship between the challenged actions of the
private-owned utility and the government. s4 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court rationalized that because the state did not grant the
monopoly, the mere fact that the utility company, a natural
monopoly, is subject to extensive state regulation does not by itself
convert the utility company's action into that of the state.8 5 Finally,
the Court ruled that the utility's practice of terminating service for
nonpayment, without giving notice or an opportunity to be heard, is
not transformed into state action solely based on the state's
86
acquiescence in the matter.
Unlike the previous holdings of the 1970s, the Court, in the 1982
case of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,87 found the necessary state
involvement where a private party and a state official had jointly
participated in the activity being challengedss The question before
the Lugar Court was whether a creditor, in conformance with a
state statutory scheme, could obtain a pre-judgement attachment of
a debtor's property without the debtor first having notice or an
different if the licenses were limited in such a way that clubs holding them had a monopoly
in the dispensing of liquor. Id.
82. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). Jackson involved an individual's claim that termination of
electric service for alleged nonpayment by a state certified, privately owned and operated
utility corporation constituted state action, which deprived the claimant of property without
due process of law. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 347-48.
83. See id. at 350-51.
84. See id. at 352-53.
85. See id. at 351-52. Natural monopolies, areas of commerce where only one business
can profitably operate due to capital requirements, are often highly regulated because no
competition exists to keep their charges reasonable. Id. at 351 n.8.
86. See id. at 354. "[The utility company] filed with the Public Utility Commission a
general tariff, a provision. . . which states [the utility company's] right to terminate service
for nonpayment." Id.
87. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Lugar involved a creditor's right to seize or dispose of his
debtor's property. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 922. In particular, the creditor (Edmondson) sued to
collect a debt and obtained a pre-judgement attachment against the property of the debtor
(Lugar), which had the effect of preventing the debtor from being able to sell the property
though the debtor remained in possession. Id. at 924-25.
88. See id. at 923.
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opportunity to be heard. 9 Justice Byron White, delivering the
opinion of the Court, stated that because government 'officials,
acting under color of state law, acted together with a private
creditor, the creditor could be held liable for violating the debtor's
due process rights as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment. 90 In
addition, the Lugar majority held that private misuse of a properly
drafted statute is not state action that can give rise to
constitutional deprivation because such misuse is not commanded
by a rule of conduct imposed by the state. 1
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has taken a quite narrow
view of the circumstances that transform private conduct into state
action via the state commanding particular actions of a private
entity; Blum v. Yarestsky 92 evidences this viewpoint. 93 The Blum
Court confronted the issue of whether decisions by a private entity
that affect constitutionally protected property interests of Medicaid
patients,94 without the patients having prior notice or an
opportunity to be heard, constitute state action that is subject to
the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. 95 The Supreme Court
reasoned that any real degree of discretion delegated to a private
party will be enough to relieve the state of responsibility for those
private actions, even though such conduct takes place within a
fairly rigid framework of state-created rules.9 6 As in Jackson, the
89. See id. at 922. To obtain the attachment, the creditor was required only to file an
ex parte petition stating a belief that his debtor might dispose of the property in order to
defeat the creditor's claim; a clerk of the court then issued a writ of attachment, which was
executed by the sheriff. Id. at 924.
90. See id. at 942.
91. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
92. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). In Blum, a class of Medicaid patients in private nursing homes
unsuccessfully claimed that decisions, by the home's utilization review committee of
physicians to discharge them or send them to facilities giving less extensive service,
constituted state action that denied them of property rights without due process of law.
Blum, 457 U.S. at 993, 995-996.
93. See id. at 992-93.
94. Id. at 993-94. "Congress established the Medicaid program in 1965 as Title XIX of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 to provide federal financial assistance to States that
choose to reimburse certain medical costs incurred by the poor." Id. "As a participating
state, New York provides Medicaid assistance to eligible persons who receive care in private
nursing homes. . .. " Id. at 994. In order to qualify for Medicaid assistance, a patient "must
satisfy eligibility criteria defined in terms of income . . . and he must seek medically
necessary services" as defined by a utilization review committee of physicians, who are not
controlled by the state. Id. at 1005-06.
95. See id. at 993, 998.
96. See id. at 1004-07. The actual discharge or transfer decisions were based on
medical judgements, which were made by independent nursing home professionals who were
not controlled by the state. Id. at 994-95.
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Blum majority also rationalized that before ruling that a private
individual is an agent of the state, the challenged activity must be a
function that the state constitution or a state statute requires the
state to provideY7 Because the nursing home was able to exercise
its own discretion, and the state is not exclusively required to
provide nursing care, the Court held that decisions by a nursing
home's utilization review committee of physicians does not
98
constitute state action.
In addition to refining the concept of state action, during the
early 1970s, the Supreme Court, in cases such as Goldberg v.
Kelly,9 found many types of government benefits to be property
interests that could not be taken without procedural due process.' °°
In Goldberg, the issue was whether welfare entitlements are rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, and if so, what process is due
when the state deprives an individual of such a right.10' The
Goldberg Court held that, if a person was presently entitled under
statute to receive welfare, such payment was a right protected by
the Fourteenth
Amendment against
subsequent
arbitrary
°2
withdrawal by the state.' By weighing the recipient's interest in
avoiding loss against the governmental interest of summary
adjudication, the majority ruled that the full panoply of procedural
97. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005.
98. See id. at 1005, 1006, 1012. "To assure that nursing home services are medically
necessary, federal law requires that a physician so certify at the time the Medicaid patient is
admitted and periodically thereafter." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1006 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g)(1)
(1976)). "New York requires that the physician complete a 'long-term care placement form'
• . . [that] provides a numerical score corresponding to the physician's assessment of the
patient's health." Id. "[Tihe physicians, and not the forms, make the decision whether the
patient's care is medically necessary" such that "a physician can authorize a patient's
admission to a nursing facility despite a 'low' score on the form." Id.
99. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg involved a complaint by federal welfare recipients
who alleged that New York state, in administering welfare programs, terminated aid without
first providing prior notice or a hearing, thereby denying them due process of law. Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 255-56.
100. See id. at 264, 269-70. Due process of law is defined as "a course of legal
proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our
systems of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights." BiAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 500 (6th ed. 1990). Furthermore, the phrase is expressed in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "[n]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
101. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254.
102. See id. at 262. By proving unable to support themselves or secure support from
other sources, the claimants had already qualified, prior to the termination proceedings, to
receive financial aid under the federally assisted and state administered program of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief
Program. Id. at 256.
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safeguards, such as an evidentiary hearing, 0 3 the right to counsel, °4
and the right to cross-examine, 0 5 was required because the
termination involves state action that adjudicates rights that are
10 6
constitutionally protected.
Concerned that the government would become paralyzed by the
continual expansion of governmental, benefits deemed to be
interests in property, the Burger Court, in Board of Regents v.
Roth, 07 began to curtail the types of public benefits that would be
considered to create a property interest.'0 In Roth, the plaintiff, a
non-tenured professor under a one-year contract to teach at
Wisconsin State University, alleged that the decision not to rehire
him, without first giving notice or an opportunity to be heard,
infringed his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 1 9 Justice Potter
Stewart's opinion in Roth emphasized that, only after determining
that the plaintiff's claim includes a property interest that implicates
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, should the Court
weigh the importance of such an interest by identifying the
procedural due process protections." 0 In determining the existence
of a property right, the Court rationalized that the plaintiff must
possess a legitimate claim of entitlement that is created and
defined by state law."' In addition, the Roth Court observed that
the Fourteenth Amendment due process protection of property
rights only applies to interests that a person has already acquired. 1 2
Because Wisconsin law explicitly empowered university officials to
make discretionary rehiring decisions, the Roth majority held that
although Roth had an abstract concern in being rehired, he had no
such entitlement that would require university officials to adhere to
3
the strictures of the Due Process Clause."
Despite Roth's severe approach, the companion case of Perry v.
103. See id. at 264.
104. See id. at 270.
105. See id. at 269.
106. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
107. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
108. Roth, 408 U.S. at 579.
109. See id. at 569.
110. See id. at 571-72.
111. Id. at 577. The Constitution does not bring about property interests, but rather
property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law ....
" Id. Under
Wisconsin law, decisions on hiring non-tenured positions were left totally to the discretion of
University officials. Id. at 566-68 n.2-4.
112. Id. at 576.
113. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578-79.
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Sindermannn 4 indicates that informal practices or customs may be
sufficient to create a legitimate claim of entitlement." 5 The issue
confronting the Perry Court was whether the plaintiff, a college
professor, possessed tenure right to reemployment created by
informal conduct and rules of the college administration and the
college's alleged de facto tenure program. 1 6 The Perry majority
found a person's claim to a benefit to be a property interest if rules
or mutually explicit understandings exist to support such an
assertion." 7 As a result, the Court held that the college must afford
the plaintiff the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his
entitlement claim prior to terminating his property interest." 8
At last, in the 1976 seminal case of Mathews v. Eldridge,"9 the
Court, convinced that a full set of procedural guarantees as defined
in Goldberg would become extremely expensive, time-consuming,
and perhaps administratively impossible, cut back on its
interpretation of exactly what procedures are required where a
property interest is at issue.120 The question facing the Mathews
Court was whether the Due Process Clause requires that the
recipient of disability benefit payments be afforded an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination. 2' After finding disability benefits to be
114. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The plaintiff in Perry, like in Roth, was untenured; however,
after teaching for ten years, his employment contract terminated and was not renewed for
the next academic year. Perry, 408 U.S. at 594-95. Furthermore, the college administration
provided Sindermann, the plaintiff, no official statement regarding the reasoning behind the
non-renewal of his contract and no opportunity for a hearing to challenge the non-renewal
decision. Id. at 595.
115. Id. at 601-02.
116. Id. at 596, 599-600. De facto is a phrase used to characterize an action or state of
affairs that must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate. BLAcK's
LAW DICnoNARY 416 (6th ed. 1990). Plaintiff asserted that for ten years he legitimately relied
upon an unusual provision that had been in the college's official Faculty Guide for many
years: "Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system." Perry, 408 U.S. at 600. "The
Administration of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent
tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a
cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy in
his work." Id.
117. See id. at 600-02.
118. See id. at 601, 604.
119. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews involved the termination of disability benefits solely
based on written correspondences between the recipient and a state agency charged with
monitoring his medical condition. Mathews, 425 U.S. at 323-324. In May 1972, the state
agency made its final determination that Eldridge had ceased to be disabled. Id. at 324.
Eldridge was then notified of the termination as well as his right to seek reconsideration. Id.
"Instead of requesting reconsideration, Eldridge commenced this action challenging the
constitutional validity of the administrative procedures ....
" Id. at 324-25.
120. Id. at 321.
121. Id. at 323.
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a constitutionally protected property interest, the majority called
for a balancing test to determine what process is due before the
recipient can be deprived of such an interest.122 In applying the test,
the Court held that disability payments, unlike the welfare
payments at issue in Goldberg, are less likely a sole source of
income, thus the individual possesses a lower stake in such an
'interest. 123 In addition, the Court found that the value of an
evidentiary hearing is less than in Goldberg because the disability
issue turned upon a medical assessment of the worker's physical
condition, which could properly be evaluated through written
documents rather than oral testimony. 124 Furthermore, the Mathews
majority ruled that the burden of supplying a full administrative
hearing was likely to be substantial, and the cost of it "may
[ultimately] come out of the pockets of the deserving since
resources available for any particular [social welfare] program are
not unlimited." 125 As a result, the Court concluded that no
evidentiary hearing was required before the termination of
126
disability benefits.
Based on this review of Supreme Court precedents regarding
127
state action and due process, the Supreme Court in Sullivan
correctly determined that no protected property interests were at
stake. However, the Court should have limited its analysis of this
controversy to the dispositive property interest issue, instead of
including in its analysis the non-dispositive issue of state action.
Furthermore, the Sullivan Court's holding on the state action issue
is incorrect.
In not finding state action, the Sullivan Court failed to realize
that when Pennsylvania amended its Workers' Compensation Act to
allow insurers to suspend payments while the disputed medical
treatment is under utilization review, the Commonwealth
encouraged private insurers to withhold medical benefits. This
encouragement is substantially similar to the unconstitutional state
122. See id. at 335. Interest by an individual in continued receipt of social security
benefits is a statutorily created property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at
332-33. The balancing test weighed the strength of the private interest affected by the official
action and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest against the government's
interest, including the function involved and administrative burdens that a due process
procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335.
123. See id. at 340-41.
124. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
125. Id. at 347-348.
126. See id. at 349.
127. 119 S. Ct. 977 (1999).
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encouragement that the Supreme Court found in Rietman 128 when
California amended its constitution to prohibit the government
from interfering with discriminatory real estate sales. In addition,
the impetus behind Pennsylvania's workers' compensation program
is that Pennsylvania is constitutionally obligated to provide for the
welfare of its citizens. 129 By delegating to insurers the traditionally
exclusive government function of determining what "reasonably"
and "necessarily" provides for citizen welfare, the act of suspending
payment by private insurers becomes attributable to the state.
Furthermore, if property interests were at issue, the practical
impact of this holding would allow Pennsylvania to sanctify, free
from the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment, private insurers'
deprivation of individual property rights. For these reasons, the
Sullivan Court erred in finding no state action. The state action
issue was not, however, a dispositive matter.
Concerning the dispositive issue of property interests, the
plaintiffs in Sullivan, unlike Goldberg,1 30 were not entitled under
state statute to receive payment for medical treatment until such
treatment was deemed reasonable and necessary. Since the
plaintiffs failed to show medical treatment received to be
reasonable and necessary, the Sullivan Court correctly held that no
property interests were at stake. As a result, the insurers were not
subject to Fourteenth Amendment constraints and could thereby,
without adhering to due process guarantees, withhold workers'
compensation benefits.
Mark A. Nuzzo

128. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
129. See PA. CONsT. Art. I, § 1. "All men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation,
and of pursuing their own happiness." Id.
130. See supra text accompanying note 99.

